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I. INTRODUCTION
The Missouri Supreme Court first adopted an implied warranty of habita-
bility or reasonable quality for the sale of a new home in Smith v. Old Warson
Development Co.1 The court rejected the traditional rule of caveat emptor and
allowed the purchaser of a new home a cause of action against the builder-
vendor for latent structural defects in the home.2 Since Old Warson, Missouri
courts have narrowly interpreted the scope of protection given by the war-
ranty. The trend in several other jurisdictions, however, has been to extend the
warranty to subsequent purchasers,3 and allow recovery under other theories
such as strict liability' and negligent construction.5 This Comment examines
1. 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (en banc).
2. Id. at 801. By adopting the implied warranty, Missouri recognized a trend
in other jurisdictions to afford purchasers of new homes this protection. See, e.g.,
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Humber v. Morton, 426
S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427
(1984) (implied warranty by builder-vendor that construction has been done in a work-
manlike manner and that the structure is habitable extends to subsequent purchaser of
a home).
4. See Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981).
1
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these recent trends and the treatment of these issues by Missouri courts.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY IN MISSOURI
Prior to Old Warson, a purchaser of a new home in Missouri could not
recover damages from the builder-vendor for defects in the home, absent an
express warranty in the deed.6 In Old Warson, the builder-vendor sold a new
house to the plaintiff purchasers.7 Within a few months, a concrete slab sup-
porting two rooms began to settle and sank, causing damage to a portion of
the house.8 The purchasers brought an action against the builder-vendor for
damages.9
The Missouri Supreme Court held that implied warranties of merchanta-
ble quality and fitness do exist in the purchase of a new home by the first
purchaser from a builder-vendor.10 The court discussed the doctrines of caveat
emptor and merger, which traditionally had been bars to recovery under an
implied warranty theory.11 The court noted the substantial trend by courts in
other jurisdictions to abandon the strict rule of caveat emptor in the sale of a
new house under circumstances similar to the Old Warson situation,1 2 and it
5. See Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983).
6. In Combow v. Kansas City Ground Inv. Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218 S.W.2d 539
(1949), the Missouri Supreme Court stated: "fA]bsent an express agreement to the
contrary, a seller of real estate cannot be held liable for defective condition of the
premises." Id. at 938, 218 S.W.2d at 541.
7. The defendant in Old Warson owned a tract of land that he subdivided into
residential lots. Defendant planned to sell the lots without homes thereon. To demon-
strate what type of home could be built on the lots, defendant hired an agent to con-
struct a display home, which the plaintiffs purchased. 479 S.W.2d at 797.
8. This settling caused doors to stick, the caulked space between the bathtub
and wall to enlarge, cracks developed in the walls, and a .space developed between the
baseboard and the floor. 479 S.W.2d at 797.
9. The plaintiffs brought an action for breach of an implied warranty of fitness
for use as a residence and for negligence in the construction of the house. The case was
submitted to the jury only on the implied warranty theory. The jury held for the plain-
tiffs but the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant. The appellate court re-
versed. For a discussion of Old Warson, see Note, Products Liability-Implied War-
ranty in the Sale of a New House, 38 Mo. L. REv. 315 (1973).
10. 479 S.W.2d at 801.
11. Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, the purchaser bears all risk as to the
quality and condition of the property being sold. Caveat emptor required the purchaser
to examine, judge, and test for himself the property being sold. See Note, supra note 9,
at 316; see also State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 634, 179 S.W.2d
19, 20 (1944) (en banc); Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 82 (1851); Humphrey v. Baker,
71 Okla. 272, 176 P. 896 (1918). See generally Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE L,J. 1133 (1931).
The doctrine of merger barred recovery under an implied warranty theory because
under this doctrine, any implied or express warranties in the contract of sale merge into
the deed and are extinguished upon execution of the deed, unless included expressly
therein. 7 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 926 (3d ed. 1963).
12. The court determined that the merger doctrine was inapplicable in cases
[Vol. 50
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also noted the trend throughout the nation to afford home purchasers the pro-
tections already afforded purchasers of chattels."3
In addition, the Old Warson court discussed two policy reasons in support
of its decision. First, the court focused on the nature of the transaction, noting
that usually the purchase of a residence is the purchase of a manufactured
product-the house, and that the transfer of the land involved is a secondary
element of the transaction.24
The second policy the court emphasized was the relative bargaining posi-
tion between the purchaser and the builder-vendor, which justifies the pur-
chaser in relying on the builder's expertise and knowledge.' 5 The purchaser's
reliance is justified, first, because latent structural defects are nearly impossi-
ble to discover after the house is built, and second, because the builder-vendor
holds the residence out to the public as fit for use as a residence and as being
of reasonable quality.' 6
Applying these policies to the facts before it, the court noted that the
defect was latent and could not be discovered even by careful inspection. 7
Furthermore, the builder-vendor held this particular home out to the public as
a model home for the subdivision.' 8 The policy underlying the Old Warson
decision is that between the ordinary, unsophisticated purchaser and the ex-
pert builder-vendor, the latter should bear the loss caused by latent structural
defects in construction.' 9
Even though the Old Warson decision established an implied warranty of
such as the one at hand because the implied warranty does not arise from the contract
of sale at all. The court stated that the implied warranty was a tort concept and not a
contract right, so that plaintiffs' rights arose as a matter of law from their purchase of
the house. 179 S.W.2d at 800.
13. 479 S.W.2d at 801. See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of
Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961); Haskell, The
Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633
(1965); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1967); Case Comment, Property-Implied Warranty of Fitness
in the Sale of a New House, 71 W. VA. L. REv. 87 (1968).
14. 479 S.W.2d at 799. The court stated that a purchaser of a new home under
the Old Warson circumstances should have at least as much protection as the pur-
chaser of a new car, gas stove, sump pump, or ladder. Id. at 799.
15. Although the Old Warson court did not discuss at length the various policy
arguments that support the warranty, it did refer to the policy discussions in similar
cases from other jurisdictions. See Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922
(1970); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969); Weeks v. Slavick Builders,
Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, affid, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271
(1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 59, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967);
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d
428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969); see also Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969) (citing cases).
16. 479 S.W.2d at 799.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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habitability in the sale of a new residence, several questions were left unan-
swered by the decision. These questions have been explored by the Missouri
courts in subsequent cases.
One question left unanswered was how serious the defect must be before
recovery is permitted under the implied warranty theory.2 0 The Old Warson
court did state that under this theory the test would be one of reasonableness
of quality.21 In Major v. Rozell,22 the court interpreted this language to in-
clude a situation where the defect did not make the house uninhabitable but
was serious enough to breach the implied warranty.23 The defect in that case
involved a leakage of water under the house that accumulated each time it
rained. 24 This leakage occurred in the room where the furnace and hot water
heater were located and it frequently caused the hot water heater to go out.25
Also, the leakage made the house damp, gave it a peculiar odor, and caused
things to mildew. The purchaser sought to recover against the builder-vendor
for damages based on an implied warranty of habitability or quality of the
house as established in Old Warson.26 The trial court found that since the
house was still habitable, the implied warranty had not been breached and
held for the builder-vendor.27 The appellate court reversed and stated that the
purchaser's cause of action under the implied warranty was not defeated
merely because the purchaser had continued living in the house.28 The court
cited O'Dell v. Custom Builders Corp.,9 wherein the Missouri Supreme Court
analogized the Old Warson warranty to the implied warranty of
merchantability found in Missouri Revised Statutes section 400.2-314. The
Rozell court stated that "[t]he fact people could live in the house does not
mean the warranty was not breached any more than the fact that an automo-
bile will run, however poorly, means the warranty of merchantability is not
20. See Note, supra note 9, at 318-19.
21. 479 S.W.2d at 801. The court stated that the builder-vendor would not be
required to construct a perfect house. Also, the court noted that the duration of the
builder-vendor's liability would be based on a standard of reasonableness. Id.
22. 618 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App., S.D. 1981).
23. Id. at 295-96.
24. Id. at 294-95.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 294. In Major v. Rozell, the plaintiff builder-vendor filed an action to
recover upon a promissory note given to them by the defendant purchasers. The latter
filed a counterclaim against the former for damages based on the implied warranty
theory.
The trial court acknowledged that there was a water problem in the crawl space
beneath the house and found that at one point the water was 17 inches deep, causing
the hot water heater to go out. But, the trial court also found that there was no struc-
tural damage to the house, the footing, the foundation or wood, and that the sump
pump should prevent the hot water heater from going out. 618 S.W.2d at 295.
27. 618 S.W.2d at 295.
28. Id.
29. 560 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
[Vol. 50
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The Rozell court briefly discussed the range of defects that constitute a
breach of the implied warranty. It noted that the breach of the warranty is not
limited to such things as cracking of foundations or rotting of floors, which are
typical structural defects. 31 The court stated that the implied warranty of hab-
itability can also be breached by the unanticipated substantial leaking of water
into a basement3 2 and by the leakage of water into the crawl space underneath
a house." The court noted, however, that the full range of defects that consti-
tute a breach of the Old Warson implied warranty had not yet been
established.3 4
Another question left unanswered in Old Warson was whether privity of
contract is required for the purchaser to recover under the implied warranty. 5
The Missouri Supreme Court in Old Warson did not have to decide the scope
of the privity requirement since the defendant was the builder and the ven-
dor.3 6 The court, however, did refer to Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 37
which abolished the privity requirement for implied warranties of personalty. 8
Courts in other jurisdictions normally permit recovery against the builder
where the builder and the vendor are separate entities.39 The rationale behind
this rule is that since the purchaser is the one who is protected by the implied
warranty, a builder should not be able to avoid liability by first selling the
home to a commercial vendor.40
30. 618 S.W.2d at 295; see Miller v. Andy Burger Motors, 370 S.W.2d 654
(Mo. App., E.D. 1963); Dubinsky v. Lindburg Cadillac Co., 250 S.W.2d 830 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1952).
31. 618 S.W.2d at 296.
32. See Elmore v. Blume, 31 Ill. App. 3d 643, 334 N.E.2d 431 (1975); McFee-
ters v. Renollet, 210 Kan. 158, 500 P.2d 47 (1972); Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158
(Okla. 1963); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803
(1967).
33. See Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557
(1976).
34. See Lieber v. Bridges, 650 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983) (defective
settling of the house); Stegan v. H.W. Freeman Constr. Co., 637 S.W.2d 794 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1982) (water service pipe from the house to the water main was not in-
stalled below the frost line).
35. See Note, supra note 9, at 319-20.
36. 479 S.W.2d at 801; see Note, supra note 9, at 319.
37. 362 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. App., Spr. 1962), afl'd, 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963)
(en banc).
38. 479 S.W.2d at 798.
39. See Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); see Note,
supra note 9, at 319 n.36.
40. Note, supra note 9, at 320; see also Bearman, supra note 14, at 571-72;
Stern & Frantze, Recent Developments in Missouri: Property Law, 48 UMKC L. Rnv.
445, 454 & nn.60-61 (1980).
Another problem raised by Old Warson is the possible exclusion or disclaimer of
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Missouri courts have vacillated on whether the implied warranty for new
home construction is contractual or tortious in nature since its adoption in Old
Warson. This characterization of the cause of action is crucial in determining
the applicable defenses, the types of warranties to be implied, and various lim-
itations on the warranty.
In Old Warson, the Missouri Supreme Court suggested that the implied
warranty was based on a tort theory. 1 Later, in O'Dell v. Custom Builders
Corp.,"2 the Missouri Supreme Court again stressed the tort nature of the war-
ranty.' 3 The O'Dell court noted that in Old Warson, it was significant that the
court had rejected the merger doctrine (as a bar to recovery on implied war-
ranty theory) by recognizing the tort nature of the implied warranty doc-
trine.4 The O'Dell court, however, analogized the Old Warson warranty to
the implied warranty of merchantability found in Missouri Revised Statutes
section 400.2-314.15 By doing so, the court seemed to indicate that the implied
warranty as to homes was a contract right that grew out of the contract of
sale, just like the implied warranty of merchantability for goods under section
400.2-314 .48
The Missouri Supreme Court resolved the issue in Crowder v.
Vandendeale,'47 stating that the implied warranty established in Old Warson
was contractual in nature.48 The court noted that Old Warson was based par-
tially on the rationale of Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co.49 In
Keener, the Missouri Supreme Court had indicated that the implied warranty
doctrine in Missouri was similar to the tort theory of strict liability.50 But, the
Crowder court distinguished Keener and the cases it relied on from Old War-
son and its progeny by focusing on the nature of recovery involved in each line
of cases. The Keener-type cases involved recovery for personal injuries or for
injuries to the property sold caused by a violent occurrence. The Crowder
41. The Old Warson court quoted the Eastern District Court of Appeals opin-
ion, which had in turn quoted the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Keener v.
Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo. 1969), where the court stated that
the difference between strict liability and implied warranty would not be one of sub-
stance in Missouri because the courts are clearly recognizing the tort nature of the
liability imposed. 479 S.W.2d at 798.
42. 560 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
43. 560 S.W.2d at 870; see Stern & Frantze, supra note,40, at 654-55.
44. 560 S.W.2d at 870.
45. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-314 (1978).
46. Stern & Frantze, supra note 40, at 655.
47. 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
48. Id. at 881. Despite the express language of the Missouri Supreme Court in
Crowder v. Vandendeale that the implied warranty is contractual, the Eastern District
Court of Appeals in Missouri recently stated that the breach of the implied warranty of
habitability is a tort concept and the court cited Old Warson as authority for this
proposition. See Steffens v. Paramount Properties, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Mo.
App., E.D. 1984).
49. 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
50. Id. at 364.
382 [Vol. 50
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
IMPLIED WARRANTY
court stated that strict liability in tort was clearly appropriate in these situa-
tions.51 But in Old Warson and similar cases, recovery is allowed for the eco-
nomic losses resulting from latent structural defects in the home, which the
Crowder court stated was a contractual type of recovery.52
The court discussed several factors in support of its conclusion that the
Old Warson implied warranty was contractual in nature. First, the court
stated that the liability imposed in Old Warson was clearly based on the trans-
action of purchase rather than the conduct of the builder.53 The court noted
that the focus of an implied warranty case is on "the quality of the home sold
rather than the conduct in building it,"" in contrast to a negligence theory,
where the focus is on both conduct and result. Furthermore, the court in Old
Warson stated that fault on the builder's part is irrelevant in an action in
implied warranty.55
A second factor the Crowder court noted to support its conclusion is the
implicit recognition in Old Warson of the possible use of traditional contract
defenses under proper circumstances. 56 In Crowder, the court pointed out that
the disclaimer in Old Warson was ineffective under the particular facts, 57 but
the possibility of a valid disclaimer or modification of the warranty under dif-
ferent facts still remained.58 The ability of the builder-vendor to limit contrac-
tually his liability is inconsistent with a conclusion that the implied warranty
is based on tort law.
The desirability of giving the builder-vendor notice of the defect and an
opportunity to repair it was the third factor discussed by the Crowder court in
concluding that the implied warranty is contractual in nature.59 The court
noted that notice was not at issue in Old Warson because the builder-vendor
was given notice of the breach and an opportunity to repair.60 The court em-
phasized that when recovery is sought on a tort theory, notice is not required. 61
If recovery were permitted on a negligence theory, the homeowner would not
have to allow the builder-vendor the opportunity to make the needed repairs.
62
Courts in other jurisdictions have characterized this implied warranty as
a contract cause of action rather than a tort action.6 3 Several of these jurisdic-
51. Crowder, 564 S.W.2d at 881.
52. Id.; see Stern & Frantze, supra note 40, at 656-57.
53. 564 S.W.2d at 881 & n.3.
54. Id. at 882.
55. Id.; see Old Warson, 479 S.W.2d at 798.
56. 564 S.W.2d at 881.
57. Old Warson, 479 S.W.2d at 800.
58. Crowder, 564 S.W.2d at 881.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court also noted that in O'Dell v. Custom Builders Corp., 560
S.W.2d 862, 866 (Mo. 1978) (en banc), another implied warranty case, notice was
given to the builder.
61. 564 S.W.2d at 881.
62. Id.
63. See Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1094, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970);
1985]
7
Schneider: Schneider: Recent Developments in Implied Warranty Actions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
tions, though, have abolished the privity requirement, allowing a subsequent
purchaser to recover from a builder-vendor." It is not clear, however, whether
these jurisdictions are moving toward characterizing the warranty as a tort
concept or have simply abolished privity of contract as a defense.
By characterizing the Old Warson implied warranty as contractual, the
Missouri Supreme Court has placed significant limitations on recovery. The
Crowder court stated that the contractual nature of the warranty implicitly
limits the cause of action to the first purchaser.6 5 Thus, privity of contract is
still a viable defense for a builder-vendor in Missouri.
Concluding that the warranty is contractual in nature also affects the
type of damages that are recoverable. The damages recoverable under contract
law relate to the deterioration or loss of bargain.66 Missouri courts are gener-
ally in accord as to the appropriate measure of damages in implied warranty
cases. The basic rule is that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the lower of the
cost of repair or the dimunition in value. 7
One court has noted the effect on damages of giving the builder-vendor
notice and an opportunity to remedy the defect. In Major v. Rozell, 8 the
court stated that when such notice is given and the builder-vendor takes action
which does not remedy the defect, but alleviates its consequences, that action
should be considered in arriving at the damages.6 9 The court also concluded
that, when sold, the value of the house should reflect the remedial action
taken.70
The protection the implied warranty provides the purchaser under con-
Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 11. 2d 31, 42, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (1979);
Theis v. Hever, 264 Ind. 1, 12, 280 N.E.2d 300, 305-06 (1972); Chandler v. Madsen,
197 Mont. 234, 239, 642 P.2d 1028, 1031 (1982); Jeanguneat v. Jackie Hames Constr.
Co., 576 P.2d 761, 764 (Okla. 1978); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282
(Wyo. 1975). See generally Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability-Contract or
Tort?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 207 (1979).
64. See, e.g., Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427,
430 (1984) (privity is not required to maintain an action for breach of the implied
warranty of workmanship and habitability); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171,
184-85, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1982) (". . . [W]hile the warranty of habitability has
roots in the execution of the contract for sale, we emphasize that it exists indepen-
dently. Privity of contract is not required.").
65. 564 S.W.2d at 881.
66. Lieber v. Bridges, 650 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983) (evidence of
unskilled and workmanlike construction is irrelevant in an implied warranty of habita-
bility action).
67. Steffens v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Mo. App., E.D.
1984); see also Ribando v. Sullivan, 588 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979). In
Major v. Rozell, 618 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App., S.D. 1981), the court stated the appropri-
ate measure of damages for breach of the implied warranty is the difference between
the value, at the time of the sale, of the house as warranted and of the house as it was
sold or the cost of remedying the defect, whichever is lower. Id. at 296.
68. 618 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App., S.D. 1981).
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tract theory is not as broad as that provided under tort theory.7' The implied
warranty, however, did evolve from tort into contract and does contain impor-
tant elements from both areas of law.7 2 One of these elements is the pur-
chaser's justified reliance upon the builder-vendor's knowledge and expertise
which is a concept more familiar to contract law than to tort law.7 3
One commentator has suggested that courts should not be concerned with
labeling the implied warranty of habitability as either a contract or tort ac-
tion. 4 She argues that the implied warranty of habitability is a judicial crea-
tion and that no statute requires that it be limited on technical grounds to any
particular buyer or to any particular type of injury.7 5 Further, courts should be
free to select the features of both contract and tort law that support the poli-
cies furthered by the implied warranty."6
III. TYPES OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Although Old Warson recognized that a purchaser has an implied war-
ranty cause of action against the builder-vendor, Missouri courts have incon-
sistently described the nature of these warranties. In Old Warson, the court
described the warranty in two different ways. First, the court adopted the ap-
pellate court's language that the implied warranty was one of "merchantable
quality and fitness."77 Later, the court defined the warranty as one of "habita-
bility or quality. 7 8
The Missouri Supreme Court attempted to clarify this issue in O'Dell v.
Custom Builders Corp.79 The court stated that although the discussion of the
implied warranty in Old Warson used the terms "fitness," "quality,"
"merchantability," and "habitability" interchangeably, the warranty imposed
71. "If the implied warranty is based upon tort theory, then the privity require-
ment is abolished, disclaimer clauses are disfavored, and there is more flexibility availa-
ble to a court in deciding what types of warranties to imply." Note, An Implied War-
ranty of Fitness and Suitability for Human Habitation as Applied to the Sales of
New Homes in Texas, 6 HOUSTON L. REv. 176, 184 (1968).
72. 12 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1505-06 (3d
ed. 1970); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 801 (1966); Toole & Habein, The Warranty of Habitability: A
Bill of Rights for Homebuyers, 44 MONT. L. REV. 159, 165-67 (1983).
73. See Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (en banc);
Case Comment, supra note 13, at 89.
74. See Mallor, Extension of the Implied Warranty of Habitability to Purchas-
ers of Used Homes, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 361 (1982). Mallor argues that the contract or
tort controversy is a throwback to the era of code pleading. Id. at 377.
75. Id. at 378.
76. Id. at 390. "The policies supporting the imposition of liability, not the terms
used to express the cause of action, should be determinative of the parameters of this
new judicial variant." Id. at 378.
77. 479 S.W.2d at 796.
78. Id. at 801.
79. 560 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
1985]
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in Old Warson was closely analogous to the "implied warranty of
merchantability" found in Missouri Revised Statutes section 400.2-314.180 The
court noted that both the common law warranty and the statutory codification
thereof require that the product be reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for
which it is used.81 The O'Dell court indicated that habitability is to new homes
what merchantability is to goods.82
The O'Dell court distinguished an implied warranty of fitness for a partic-
ular use from the implied warranty of habitability established in Old Warson.
In O'Dell, the court held the builder liable for breach of an implied warranty
that the house plans prepared by the builder for the plaintiffs were fit for use
in the construction of a house.83 The court held that there was an implied
warranty that the plans would be fit for the purposes intended, which was that
a house be built on the land in question.8' The plaintiff's claim in O'Dell was
not based on the theory that the plans were unmerchantable but rather that
they were not fit for use on the lot where plaintiffs were to build.85
Missouri appellate courts have referred to the Old Warson implied war-
ranty in several ways. In Stegan v. H.W. Freeman Construction Co.,88 the
Eastern District Court of Appeals stated that the Old Warson implied war-
ranty is an "implied warranty of fitness for use."817 The court found that this
warranty was breached by a water line problem that caused a portion of a
water pipe to freeze leaving the plaintiffs without water service for twenty
days. 88
Another important distinction is the difference between an implied war-
ranty of merchantability or habitability and an implied warranty that the
house will be built in a skillful and workmanlike manner. The Old Warson
implied warranty is applicable only to the sale of a completed new house.89
Subsequent cases have emphasized that the Old Warson implied warranty of
habitability relates to the quality of the house, not the workmanship in build-
ing it.9o For example, the court in Eckert v. Dishon91 emphasized that the
80. Id. at 870.
81. Id.; see Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-314, comment 8 (1978).
82. 560 S.W.2d at 871.
83. Id.; see Sinclair, supra note 19, at 238.
84. 560 S.W.2d at 871.
85. Id. at 871. Therefore, the court concluded that Old Warson did not apply.
86. 637 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
87. Id. at 797.
88. Id.
89. O'Dell v. Custom Builders Corp., 560 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1978) (en banc);
Ribando v. Sullivan, 588 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979); Barrett v. Jenkins,
510 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. App., St. L. 1974).
90. Lieber v. Bridges, 650 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983). The court
stated that when damages are sought for the deterioration of a house and the claim
involves breach of an implied warranty, the issue is whether or not the house meets a
certain standard of quality.
91. 617 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
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implied warranty as to residential property is the warranty of habitability and
merchantability and not that the residence is constructed in a skillful and
workmanlike manner and is free from defects in workmanship and materials.
92
An implied warranty that the contractor will perform the work in a reasonably
workmanlike manner is applicable where there is a contract to build a house,
and not where the transaction involves the sale of a completed new house.93
Courts in other jurisdictions have referred to the implied 'warranty of hab-
itability in the sale of a completed new home in numerous ways, including an
implied warranty of reasonable workmanship and habitability,9' an implied
warranty of fitness for habitation and workmanlike construction,95 an implied
warranty of fitness for use intended and reasonably good and workmanlike
construction,96 and an implied warranty of reasonably workmanlike construc-
tion and fitness for habitation.
9 7
Arguably, the scope of the implied warranty imposed by many jurisdic-
tions is broader than the warranty imposed in Missouri. Other jurisdictions
have included in their interpretation of the warranty a "workmanlike construc-
tion" prong, whereas Missouri has not done so.98
At least one commentator has suggested that the workmanlike construc-
tion prong of the implied warranty is analogous to the question of whether the
builder-vendor was negligent in the construction of the home.99 This is because
the reasonableness of the builder-vendor's conduct must be examined in deter-
92. Id. at 650. In Eckert, the court held that the modification of the mandatory
jury instruction, MAI 25.03, constituted prejudicial error because it could have misled
the jury on the law of implied warranty. The modified instruction required the jury to
find the residence free from defects and built in a workmanlike manner. The court
stated that such a finding is not required to hold the defendant liable under breach of
the implied warranty. See O'Dell v. Custom Builders Corp., 560 S.W.2d 862, 870-71
(Mo. 1978) (en banc).
93. Ribando, 588 S.W.2d at 123. The common law in Missouri prior to Old
Warson clearly recognized this obligation upon one who contracts to build a house. See
Kennedy v. Bowling, 319 Mo. 401, 4 S.W.2d 438 (1928) (en banc); Freeman Con-
tracting Co. v. Lefferdink, 419 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. App., St. L. 1967); Pitzer v. Hercher,
318 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. App., St. L. 1958). Legal commentators also recognize this im-
plied warranty of good workmanship in construction contracts. See Bearman, supra
note 13, at 571; Haskell, supra note 13, at 637; Roberts, supra note 13, at 838; Case
Comment, supra note 13, at 88.
94. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 62, 154 N.W.2d 803, 807
(1967).
95. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 84, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964).
96. McKeever v. Mercaldo, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 188, 192 (1954).
97. Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 641, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1974).
98. See, e.g., Columbia W. Corp. v. Vela, 122 Ariz. 28, 33, 592 P.2d 1294,
1299 (Ct. App. 1979) (builder-vendor impliedly warrants that the construction was
done in a workmanlike manner and that the structure is habitable); Chandler v. Mad-
sen, 197 Mont. 234, 239, 642 P.2d 1028, 1031 (1982) (builder-vendor of a new home
impliedly warrants that the residence is constructed in a workmanlike manner and is
suitable for habitation).
99. Toole & Habein, supra note 72, at 162.
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mining whether the house was constructed in an unworkmanlike manner.' 0 In
jurisdictions that have recognized both prongs of the implied warranty, it is
not clear whether a breach of both must be proved to recover damages.' 0 ' The
Montana Supreme Court in Chandler v. Madsen'02 recognized both the im-
plied warranties of workmanlike construction and habitability. The court,
however, appeared to base liability on the implied warranty of habitability and
not on the builder-vendor's negligence. 03
IV. EXTENSION OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY TO SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS
Several jurisdictions have extended the implied warranty of habitability
to second or subsequent purchasers of a residence. 0 4 This situation usually
arises when the first purchaser from the builder sells the home to a subsequent
purchaser who later discovers a latent defect. There are strong policy argu-
ments in support of extending the implied warranty to subsequent purchasers,
despite the lack of a contractual relationship between the subsequent pur-
chaser and the builder-vendor.
Missouri courts have refused to extend the implied warranty to subse-
quent purchasers. In Crowder v. Vandendeale,0 5 the Missouri Supreme Court
held that the contractual nature of the implied warranty limits the cause of
action to the first purchaser. Thus, in Missouri a subsequent purchaser has no
recourse against the builder-vendor for latent structural defects unless physical
injury or property damage results from some violent occurrence. 06 A recent
Missouri appellate court decision reaffirmed Crowder, denying a second pur-
chaser a cause of action based on implied warranty.107 The court emphasized
that the purchaser must be in privity with the builder-vendor to have a valid
implied warranty cause of action. 0 8
100. Id.
101. Id.; Case Comment, supra note 13 at 118-19.
102. 197 Mont. 234, 642 P.2d 1028 (1982).
103. Id. at 238, 241-42, 642 P.2d at 1031, 1033; see Toole & Habein, supra note
72, at 162.
104. Eight jurisdictions to date have extended the implied warranty to subse-
quent purchasers. See Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d
427 (1984); Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981);
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Il. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982); Barnes v. Mac Brown
& Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739 (Okla.
1982); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Gupta v. Ruter
Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d
733 (Wyo. 1979).
105. 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
106. Stern & Frantze, supra note 40, at 656.
107. John H. Armbruster & Co. v. Hayden Co.-Builder-Developer, 622 S.W.2d
704, 705 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981). The court also denied the former owner an implied
warranty cause of action because it no longer had an interest in the residence.
108. Id. In Missouri, the warranty arises by reason of the first purchase from the
builder-vendor. Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1981); see supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
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Missouri courts' refusal to extend the implied warranty cause of action to
subsequent purchasers is unsatisfactory since the policy reasons that persuaded
courts to adopt the implied warranty as to first purchasers are arguably appli-
cable in the subsequent purchaser context as well. From a policy standpoint,
the warranty seeks basically to protect innocent purchasers and hold builders
accountable for their work. 109 The courts that have afforded subsequent pur-
chasers the protections of the implied warranty stress that, like the first pur-
chaser, a subsequent purchaser has little knowledge of construction methods,
has no reasonable opportunity to discover latent defects upon inspection, and
must rely on the expertise and knowledge of the builder. 011 As the Texas Su-
preme Court stated, "[t]he effect of the latent defect on the subsequent owner
is just as great as on the original buyer and the builder is no more able to
justify his improper work as to a subsequent owner than to the original
buyer.""'" Extending the warranty to subsequent purchasers furthers rather
than hinders the purposes that the warranty was designed to serve.
The courts that have extended the implied warranty to subsequent pur-
chasers have done so by recognizing the mobility of today's society." 2 These
courts indicate that it is reasonably foreseeable to the builder-vendor that the
house will be resold, frequently within a short period of time. Therefore, it is
argued that the extension of the warranty will not place undue hardship on
builder-vendors." 3
In addition, relaxation of the privity requirement in products liability
cases has influenced the courts that have extended the implied warranty to
subsequent purchasers. The privity of contract requirement between a builder-
vendor and a purchaser is considered by some to be an "outmoded" concept,
just as is the privity of contract requirement between the manufacturer and
the user of a product."14 One court abolished the privity requirement between
the builder-vendor and supported its action by arguing that the state legisla-
ture had already abolished the privity requirement by statute."a 5
109. See Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427, 430
(1984); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979).
110. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 183-84, 441 N.E.2d 324,
330 (1982); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. 1983).
111. Gupta, 646 S.W.2d at 169.
112. See, e.g., Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, , 271 S.E.2d 768, 769
(1980).
113. Gupta, 646 S.W.2d at 170 (Spears, J., concurring).
114. Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 230, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621
(1976).
115. In Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670, 673 (Miss. 1983), the
Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the argument that the removal of the privity re-
quirement should be a legislative rather than a judicial decision. The court believed
that the Mississippi legislature had already removed the privity requirement in all cases
by enacting the following statute:
In all causes of action for personal injury or property damage or eco-
nomic loss brought on account of negligence, strict liability or breach of war-
ranty, including actions brought under the provisions of the Uniform Com-
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Courts that have refused to extend the implied warranty to subsequent
purchasers express concern that extension of the warranty would subject the
builder-vendor to unlimited liability for an unlimited period of time.,16 How-
ever, courts that have extended the warranty address this concern by placing
limits on the subsequent purchaser's ability to recover and by allowing the
builder-vendor to use certain defenses.
For example, some courts have provided that the length of time for which
the builder-vendor will be liable will be governed by a "reasonableness" stan-
dard. The Indiana Supreme Court has suggested that surrounding circum-
stances, including the age of the home, its maintenance, and the use to which
it had been put, should be considered in determining whether the warranty has
been breached."' Another court has suggested that the statute of limitations
for actions for faulty construction governs, regardless of the number of subse-
quent purchasers." 8 Another defense that the builder-vendor can assert
against the subsequent purchaser is that the defect was apparent or readily
discoverable prior to the purchase. 19
The burden is on the subsequent purchaser to show that the defect had its
origin and cause in the builder-vendor.1 0 Therefore, the builder-vendor has
available all the traditional contract defenses. The builder-vendor can avoid
liability by showing that the defects are not attributable to him or that they
are the result of ordinary wear and tear.' 2' The builder-vendor can also avoid
liability by proving that a substantial alteration or change in the condition of
the house has occured since the original sale. 22 Thus, the courts' fear of un-
limited liability for builder-vendors is unfounded since reasonable limits can be
placed on the builder-vendor's liability by balancing the hardship placed on
each party.
mercial Code, privity shall not be a requirement to maintain said action.
MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). Missouri has no similar
statute. But cf. Barnes, 342 N.E.2d at 622 (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (the change
should come about by legislative action, if at all).
116. Barnes, 264 Ind. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 621; Richards, 139 Ariz. at
678 P.2d at 430; Terlinde, 275 S.C. at ., 271 S.E.2d at 769; Blagg, 272 Ark. at
187, 612 S.W.2d at 322.
117. Barnes, 264 Ind. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 621.
118. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439
So. 2d 670, 673 (Miss. 1983), stated that under the applicable statute of limitations,
the homebuilder's potential liability exists for ten years.
119. Barnes, 264 Ind. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 621; Gupta, 646 S.W.2d at 170
(Spears, J., concurring); Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 185, 441 N.E.2d at 331.
120. Richards, 139 Ariz. at ... _, 678 P.2d at 430; Gupta, 646 S.W.2d at 170
(Spears, J., concurring).
121. Richards, 139 Ariz. at , 678 P.2d at 430.
122. Gupta, 646 S.W.2d at 170 (Spears, J., concurring).
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V. LIABILITY OF THOSE OTHER THAN THE BUILDER-VENDOR UNDER THE
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY: AGAINST WHOM CAN THE ACTION
BE BROUGHT?
The question of who may be held liable under the Old Warson implied
warranty of habitability recently arose in a Western District Missouri Court
of Appeals decision which addressed whether a lending institution may be held
liable for a breach of the warranty. In Allison v. Home Savings Associa-
tion, 23 the court held that the lender could not be held liable for damages
under a theory of breach of implied warranty of habitability.124 The court re-
viewed the pertinent language from Old Warson which specified that only
those who have the opportunity to observe and correct construction defects can
be held liable for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.125 The plain-
tiff purchasers argued that the lending institution fell within this rule, but the
court rejected their argument because there was no evidence that the lending
institution had either the opportunity to observe or actual knowledge of con-
struction defects.1 26 The evidence offered showed that the lending institution's
only involvement in the pre-construction phase was financing. The plaintiffs
asserted that the lender should have known of the possibility of defective con-
struction, but the court stated that this was not enough to hold the lender
liable under the Old Warson implied warranty theory.
1 27
123. 643 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
124. Id. at 851.
125. Id. The Old Warson court stated that:
[T]he rationale for allowing recovery by a purchaser of a new house, on a
theory of breach of an implied warranty of habitability or quality, is applica-
ble only against that person who not only had an opportunity to observe but
failed to correct a structural defect, which, in turn, became latent, Le., the
builder-vendor.
479 S.W.2d at 801 (emphasis added).
126. 643 S.W.2d at 851. If there had been evidence that the lending institution
did have an opportunity to observe and inspect each stage of construction of the houses,
the result may have been different.
127. Id. The plaintiff purchasers also alleged that Home Savings, as the lender,
owed a duty to them to detect and warn of defects in construction. They claimed this
duty arose because Home Savings' "extensive involvement" in the construction project
either made Home Savings aware or should have made Home Savings aware of the
possibility that the financially-troubled builder would cut corners in construction
materials and methods. Id. However, the plaintiffs raised this argument for the first
time on appeal, so the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review. Id. at 852.
Even though the question was not properly preserved for review, the court discussed the
matter and concluded that the record did not support the existence of such a duty as
the plaintiffs sought to impose. Id. at 852-53.
The court discussed Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447
P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968), in which the lending institution was held to owe a
duty, as a lender, to purchasers of new houses to exercise reasonable care to see that
the houses were constructed free of defects. The Home Savings court distinguished
Connor on the basis of the involvement of the lender in the construction process. 643
S.W.2d at 852. The activities of the lender in Connor had clearly exceeded those of a
1985]
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Several other jurisdictions have addressed this question. 12 8 The Arizona
Supreme Court, in Smith v. Continental Bank,1 29 refused to hold the lender
liable for construction defects under an implied warranty theory applying a
rationale similar to that used by the Home Savings court. The lender in Smith
was partially involved in the construction of the house because bank officials
reviewed the original construction plans and specifications.1 30 The court, how-
ever, focused on the normal course of business of the seller/lender and con-
cluded that since the lender did not engage in the business of building and
selling homes or hold itself out as a homebuilder, it could not be held liable on
an implied warranty theory.1 3 1
Most courts are unwilling to extend liability to construction lenders under
an implied warranty theory. A plausible argument, however, can be made that
liability could be imposed in cases where the construction lender has greater
knowledge of the construction of the house and the purchaser, lacking the
knowledge or ability to discover defects, justifiably relies on the lender's exper-
tise. As the court stated in Allison v. Home Savings Association, at the least,
liability should not be imposed on the construction lender unless there is evi-
dence that the lender had the opportunity to observe or had actual knowledge
of construction defects.1 32 Without this requirement, a mere seller of real es-
tate could also be held liable for defects causing economic loss under the im-
plied warranty theory. 13
3
Another issue recently confronted by a Missouri appellate court was
whether the implied warranty doctrine for newly-constructed homes should be
extended to include large commercial buildings. The court in Chubb Group of
Insurance Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Associates' held that the doctrine should
normal lender. See Connor, 69 Cal. 2d at 864, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal Rptr. at 376.
The Home Savings court stated that the activities of the lender in Home Savings
did not exceed those of a normal lender. The lender financed the construction of the
subdivision, acquired title to the two properties after their construction, and later sold
them. 643 S.W.2d at 852.
Moreover, the court stated that many states had passed statutes in response to the
Connor decision. Id. Missouri has such a statute. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 369.264 (1978).
This statute limits the liability of a construction lender for the sale of defective new
houses to cases where the lender knowingly misrepresents the character of the real
property. 643 S.W.2d at 852.
128. See Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Ga. App. 40, 262 S.E.2d
230 (1979); Henry v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 313 Pa. Super. 128, 459 A.2d 772
(1983); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 247 (1971) (citing cases).
129. 130 Ariz. 320, 636 P.2d 98 (1981).
130. Id. at 321, 636 P.2d at 99.
131. Id. at 322, 636 P.2d at 100.
132. 643 S.W.2d at 851; see Comment, Implied Warranties in New Homes and
Their Extention to Subsequent Purchasers in Arizona, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 119.
133. See generally Ferguson, Lender's Liability for Construction Defects, 11
REAL EST. L.J. 310 (1983).
134. 656 S.W.2d 766, 783 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
[Vol. 50
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
IMPLIED WARRANTY
not be so extended.113 In Chubb Group, the tenants of the city arena brought
suit against the defendants on several theories for damages caused by a roof
collapse. 1 6 The plaintiff tenants claimed that the defendants had breached an
implied warranty that the arena was designed and constructed in a skillful and
workmanlike manner and that it was free of defects in design, workmanship,
and material.13 7
First, the court noted that the extension of the implied warranty for
newly-constructed houses to large commercial buildings was an extension few
courts had adopted. 38 There are several reasons why the doctrine should not
be extended to commercial buildings. First, a primary reason for implying a
warranty of habitability or quality in the sale of newly-constructed residences
is the disparity of bargaining power between the builder-vendor and the pur-
chaser.13 9 Arguably, this disparity is not present when the transaction involves
commercial property. Second, sellers of commercial buildings assert that the
implied warranty is inapplicable to the sale of commercial buildings because
the purchaser there is concerned with the income-producing potential of the
building and not with its habitability. 4 0 The Chubb Group court did note that
one court had extended the warranty to part-residential, part-commercial
buildings, but did not find its reasoning persuasive.14'
In Chubb Group, the court stated that even if it did adopt the minority
view that commercial owners are entitled to the implied warranty protections,
135. See Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: New Implications, New
Applications, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 296 (1980).
136. 656 S.W.2d at 769.
137. Id. at 781. Arguably, Old Warson was inapplicable to the plaintiff's claim.
The Old Warson implied warranty does not include an implied warranty of good work-
manship, which is what it appears the plaintiffs in Chubb Group were claiming had
been breached.
138. Id. at 782. The extension of the implied warranty to builders of commercial
buildings has been adopted in only three states. See Markman v. Hoefer, 252 Iowa
118, 123, 106 N.W.2d 59, 62 (1960) (defectively built onion storage and curing build-
ing); Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 274 Minn. 17, 24,
143 N.W.2d 622, 625-26 (1966) (structure that builder had implicitly guaranteed
would be fit for its intended purpose collapsed when 100,000 bushels of wheat were
stored there); Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649, 654 (N.D.
1977) (defective installation of electrical system in plant facility). In each of these
cases, the defendant was held liable under an implied warranty that the structure
would be fit for its intended purpose.
139. Hodgson v. Chin, 168 N.J. Super. 549, 553, 403 A.2d 942, 944 (1979).
140. Id. at 553, 403 A.2d at 944.
141. Hodgson extended the implied warranty of fitness on the particular facts of
the case. The building consisted of two small stores on the first floor and two apart-
ments on the second floor, the seller was a relatively small builder-vendor, and the
purchasers were small business persons who reasonably relied on the building being
reasonably fit for the intended use. Id. at 555, 403 A.2d at 945. The Chubb Group
court noted that the Hodgson court impliedly disapproved of the extension of the war-
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lack of privity of contract precluded recovery in the case. 42 Under the minor-
ity position, a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty exists only
between plaintiffs who have contracted for building services and the builders
with whom they contract, and then only when the owner places particular reli-
ance on the builder's competence.143 The plaintiffs in Chubb Group were the
tenants of the commercial owners, not the owners themselves. The court stated
that extending implied warranty protections to the tenants would certainly vio-
late Missouri's privity of contract requirement for implied warranty.1 4
The court analogized the commercial building situation to cases involving
residential subsequent purchasers.145 The court noted that both commercial
tenants and second purchasers are arguably within the class of persons in need
of protection from structural defects, but, nevertheless, second purchasers have
been specifically denied the implied warranty protections in Missouri due to
lack of privity.146 Although the holding in Chubb Group was limited to the
tenants of commercial owners, the court indicated that the extension of the
implied warranty for newly-constructed homes to commercial buildings was
not appropriate even where the plaintiff is the commercial owner.147
VI. DISCLAIMER AND EXCLUSION OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
Since the purchaser of a new home in Missouri cannot bring a negligence
action against the builder-vendor for latent structural defects, the purchaser
must rely on the Old Warson implied warranty theory.148 Missouri courts have
established that the builder-vendor may disclaim or limit the warranty, but in
doing so they place a heavy burden on the homebuilder to show the effective-
ness of the disclaimer.
In Old Warson, the builder-vendor claimed that the sale contract con-
tained a provision that expressly disclaimed all warranties. The provision pro-
vided that the "property is to be accepted in its present condition unless other-
wise stated in contract.' 49 The Missouri Supreme Court held that this was
not an effective disclaimer of the warranty.180 The court determined that a
reasonable interpretation of the "present condition" provision is that it pre-
cludes the purchaser from demanding that the builder-vendor do any addi-
tional work on the house, such as painting it a different color or adding a
142. Chubb Group, 656 S.W.2d at 783.
143. Id. at 782.
144. Id.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 104-22.
146. 656 S.W.2d at 782; see Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 883
(Mo. 1978) (en bane); John H. Armbruster & Co. v. Hayden Co.-Builder-Developer,
Inc., 622 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981).
147. 656 S.W.2d at 782.
148. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.








The elements of an effective disclaimer were further detailed by the court
in Crowder v. Vandendeale. Because the implied warranty is contractual in
nature, the right of the parties to allocate the economic risk by disclaiming
warranties involved in the transaction is preserved.1 2 The court concluded that
the builder-vendor not only must show that the disclaimer was conspicuous
and that it fully disclosed the consequences of the disclaimer, but also that the
parties in fact agreed to the provision.153 The court then determined that a
boilerplate clause was ineffective under this approach and emphasized that a
"knowing waiver of this protection will not be readily implied."' " The Mis-
souri courts have yet to confront this issue squarely since Crowder, but it is
clear that it will not be an easy task for the builder-vendor to avoid liability by
disclaiming the warranty.155
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court in G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux,58 con-
sidered the sufficiency of warranty disclaimers and issued a stern warning to
new home purchasers. In essence, the contract language provided that no war-
ranties, express or implied, existed in addition to those in the written instru-
ments.157 The test the court used to determine the effectiveness of the dis-
claimer was whether it was "clear and free from doubt."15 8 The Texas
Supreme Court held that the disclaimer met this standard noting that parties
151. Id.
152. Crowder, 564 S.W.2d at 881.
153. Id. at 881 n.4.
154. Id. It has been suggested that no other court has gone as far as the Missouri
Supreme Court did in Crowder in setting forth such stringent standards for a valid
disclaimer. See Note, Implied Warranties in New Home Sales-Is the Seller Defense-
less?, 35 S.C.L. REv. 469, 479 (1984).
155. In Lieber v. Bridges, 650 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. App., S.D. 1983), the court
concluded that there was no evidentiary support for the defendant's contention that it
disclaimed any implied warranties. The court cited Crowder and stated that the defen-
dant had failed to prove that there was a knowing waiver of any implied warranties.
The plaintiffs, though, did elicit testimony from the defendant in which he denied ever
telling plaintiffs that he was limiting his responsibility for the construction. Id. at 691.
156. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
157. The contract language provided:
This note, the aforesaid Mechanic's and Materialmen's Lien Contract and the
plans and specification signed for identification by the parties hereto consti-
tute the entire agreement between the parties hereto with reference to the
erection of said improvements, there being no oral agreements, representa-
tions, conditions, warranties, express or implied, in addition to said written
instruments.
643 S.W.2d at 393 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 393. Several other jurisdictions apply a similar standard. See Sloat v.
Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Colo. 1981) ("clear and unambiguous"); Rapallo S.
Inc. v. Jack Taylor Dev. Corp., 375 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("ex-
press repudiation or renunciation of any alternative form of warranty"), cert. denied
sub nom. Jack Taylor Dev. Corp. v. Rapallo S., Inc., 385 So. 2d 758 (1980); Griffin v.
Wheeler Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 202, 225 S.E.2d 557, 568 (1976) ("clear and
unambiguous language reflecting the fact that the parties fully intended such result").
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to a contract have an obligation to protect themselves by reading what they
sign. 159 Thus, in Texas a homebuilder may disclaim the implied warranty
without specifically referring to the warranty.16 0 One commentator has sug-
gested that this signals a return to caveat emptor in residential real estate
transactions in Texas.161
VII. OTHER THEORIES OF RECOVERY: NEGLIGENT CONSTRUCTION AND
STRICT LIABILITY
In addition to the implied warranty of habitability or quality, subsequent
purchasers have brought suits against builder-vendors on negligence and strict
liability theories. 62 Generally, courts that have considered the issue have al-
lowed a subsequent purchaser to bring a negligence action against the builder-
vendor for personal injury or property damage resulting from latent defects.1 63
However, not all courts allow a subsequent purchaser a negligence claim
against the builder-vendor. Missouri does not even allow the first purchaser a
claim in negligence against the builder-vendor for latent structural defects in
the house.164
In Crowder v. Vandendeale,165 the Missouri Supreme Court set forth rea-
sons why an action in negligence should not be allowed a purchaser when
purely economic loss results. The court emphasized that a duty to use ordinary
care and skill is imposed on the builder-vendor when it is determined that an
interest entitled to protection will be damaged if such care is not exercised.,66
The court noted that such interests include safety or freedom from physical
harm (either to the person or property) but do not include mere deterioration
or loss of bargain. Loss of bargain refers to a failure to meet some standard of
quality that is determined by the contract between the parties. The court
159. 643 S.W.2d at 393.
160. The dissent in Robichaux believed that the better rule was that the waiver
must be in clear and unequivocal language specifically naming the warranty that is
being disclaimed. The dissent stated that this was necessary to effectuate the public
policies underlying the implied warranty. 643 S.W.2d at 394-95 (Spears, J., dissent-
ing). The dissent cited Crowder v. Vandendeale as requiring clear and express language
for the waiver to be effective. Id. at 395; see also Peterson v. Hubschman Constr. Co.,
76 III. 2d 31, 43, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (1979) (a knowing disclaimer will not violate
public policy but any such disclaimer must be strictly construed against the builder-
vendor); Casavant v. Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24, 28, 327 A.2d 831, 834 (1974) (lan-
guage used must refer specifically to its effect on the implied warranty).
161. See Anderson, Disclaiming the Implied Warranties of Habitability and
Good Workmanship in the Sale of New Houses: The Supreme Court of Texas and the
Duty to Read the Contracts You Sign, 15 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 517, 522 (1984).
162. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.4th 385 (1981) (citing cases).
163. Id. at 388.
164. Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
165. Id. at 881-82. Missouri does allow a cause of action if physical injury or
property damage results. Id. at 881.
166. 564 S.W.2d at 882.
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believed that a negligence claim should not be allowed for this type of loss
because the builder-vendor would be unable to allocate the economic risk with
the purchaser.167 The court also noted that allowing recovery for economic loss
could result in a situation where the builder-vendor is held liable in negligence
to a subsequent purchaser, even if such liability was disclaimed as to the first
purchaser.' 68
The Crowder position was followed recently in Clark v. Landelco.6 9 The
court in Clark stated that in Missouri there is no cause of action in tort for
deterioration or loss of bargain damages resulting from a builder's alleged neg-
ligence in the construction of a residence. 70 An action in negligence can be
maintained only when the negligent acts of the builder result in personal
injury.17 '
Cases from other jurisdictions indicate a residential builder-vendor may
be held liable on the basis of negligence to a subsequent purchaser. In Cosmo-
politan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 272 the Colorado Supreme Court allowed subse-
quent purchasers to assert a claim for property damage to the residence alleg-
edly caused by the homebuilder's negligence, but limited the claim to latent
defects not discoverable prior to purchase. 73 The court noted that the policy
reasons for extending a negligence cause of action to subsequent purchasers
are based on many of the same reasons for implying a warranty of habitability
to the first purchaser.' 7 ' Both claims are intended to protect innocent purchas-
ers from experienced, knowledgeable builder-vendors. 7 5
167. Id.
168. Id. at 883.
169. 657 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
170. Id. at 635.
171. Id. at 636.
172. 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983).
173. Id., at 1042. The court distinguished Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d
171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982) and Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo.
1978) (en bane), where the courts refused to extend the negligence cause of action to
subsequent purchasers. The Weller court stated that in Missouri and Illinois, recovery
in tort for economic loss is not allowed but in Colorado such recovery is allowed. 663
P.2d at 1044.
174. Although the Colorado Supreme Court allowed a subsequent purchaser a
negligence cause of action against the builder-vendor, it refused to extend the implied
warranty to subsequent purchasers. The court distinguished the two on the scope of
duty involved and the basis for liability. The implied warranty arises from the contrac-
tual relationship between the purchaser and the builder-vendor, and proof of a defect is
sufficient to establish liability. However, proof of a defect alone is insufficient to estab-
lish a negligence claim. Negligence requires that a builder be held to a standard of
reasonable care in the conduct of its duties to the foreseeable users of the property.
Also, the purchaser must establish that the defect was caused by the defendant builder.
663 P.2d at 1045.
175. Id.; see Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 444, 578
P.2d 637, 638-39 (1978); Simmons v. Owens, 363 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978). Another reason the court gave for extending a negligence claim to a subsequent
purchaser is that given the mobility of homeowners today, it is foreseeable to the
1985]
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Other courts have held the builder-vendor liable to a subsequent pur-
chaser for latent structural defects on a strict liability theory.1 6 In Blagg v.
Fred Hunt Co., 1 " the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a subsequent pur-
chaser can hold a builder-vendor strictly liable for property damage to the
house. The court, construing the Arkansas strict liability statute,17 8 held that
the word "product" is as applicable to a house as to an automobile.7  The
Arkansas court adopted the views of Justice Francis in Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc.,80 where the doctrine of strict liability was extended to
cover purely economic loss resulting from a defective product. The Arkansas
court then referred to Schipper v. Levitt and Sons, Inc., 81 where the same
court that decided Santor stated that strict liability principles should be car-
ried over into the realty field.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although Missouri recognized that a builder-vendor of new housing may
be liable to the purchaser for latent structural defects under the implied war-
ranty doctrine in 1972,182 Missouri courts have been reluctant to expand the
scope of the warranty. A subsequent purchaser in Missouri still has no cause
of action against the builder-vendor for damages arising from latent structural
defects, even though the economic loss to the subsequent purchaser can be just
as great as the loss to the first purchaser. Until Missouri abolishes the privity
of contract requirement in implied warranties, the protections given by the
Old Warson implied warranty will remain limited to those who purchase
newly-constructed homes from builder-vendors. Perhaps the injustice of re-
quiring privity of contract in this situation will be reexamined by Missouri
builder-vendor that the home will be resold and any structural defects will be just as
harmful to the subsequent purchaser as to the first. 663 P.2d at 1045.
176. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 229, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 749, 753 (1969); Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 433, 437 A.2d 925,
929 (1981). See generally Rabin & Grossman, Defective Products or Realty Causing
Economic Loss: Toward a Unified Theory of Recovery, 12 S.W.U.L. REV. 4 (1981);
Comment, Strict Tort Liability to the Builder-Vendor of Homes: Schipper and Be-
yond?, 10 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 103 (1983).
177. 272 Ark. 185, ., 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (1981). In Blagg, the subsequent
purchasers became the owners approximately nine months after the date of the original
sale. After they purchased the home, a strong odor and fumes from formaldehyde be-
came apparent, which they traced to the carpet and pad installed by the builder. The
purchasers brought this action under implied warranty and strict liability.
178. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2 (Supp. 1979).
179. Blagg, 612 S.W.2d at 324.
180. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (plaintiff purchaser allowed a strict liabil-
ity cause of action against the manufacturer of defective carpeting even though plain-
tiff's damage was limited to loss of value of the carpeting).
181. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (builder-vendor held strictly liable to child
of purchaser's lessee for injuries sustained due to a defective hot water distribution
system design).
182. Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (en bane).
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courts in the near future, as the number of jurisdictions abandoning the privity
requirement increases. In addition, since Missouri courts view the implied war-
ranty as contractual in nature, a builder-vendor can effectively disclaim the
warranty although a court will carefully scrutinize any such claim of waiver.
KAREN LEE SCHNEIDER
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